Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

Tyrone Busch v. Salt Lake International Airport :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.; Nelson, Snuffer & Duhle; Attorney for Appellant.
Roger H. Bullock; Strong & Hanni; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Busch v. Salt Lake International Airport, No. 960041 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/37

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO..

BRIEE

IN AND FOR THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
TYRONE BUSCH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

vs.
SALT LAKE INTERNATIONAL,
AIRPORT, a Government Agency,
doing business in Salt Lake
City, Utah,
Defendant/Appellee.

No. 960041CA
(95-0902272PI)
Priority #15

FE3 23 1996

COUH

Roger H. Bullock
STRONG & HANI
Attorneys for the Defendant/Appellee
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

~SALS

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400

IN AND FOR THE SUPREME
STATE OF UTAH

IA-UHI"

TYRONE BUSCH,
Plaint i ff/Appellant,

APPEIJLAN'I ' , ; : P H P I / /

BRIFF

vs.
SALT LAKE I N T E R N A T I 0 N A L /
AIRPORT, a Government Agency
doing business in Salt Lake
City, Utah,
Defendant/Appellee.

No. 960041CA

Priority ~ i 5

Roger H. Bullock
STRONG & HANI
Attorneys for the Defendant/Appellee
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (son ^12-7080

Denver c. Snuffer, Jr.
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801 "'ft- Hun

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appellant, Tyrone Busch, submits this reply brief in the
above appeal.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Table of Contents

Page ii

Table of Authorities

Page 1

Applicable Rules and Regulations to Appeal

Page 2

Argument of Appellant

Page 3-7

Conclusion

Page 7

APPENDIX

Page 9

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:
RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21

Page 5

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13

Page 3,4

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12

Page 3

Utah Code Ann. §60-30-11

Page 3

Utah Code Ann. §60-30-11 (4) (a)

Page 5

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14

Page 4

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15(2)

Page 4
CASES

Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994)

Page 6

Lamarr v. Utah State of Transportation, 828 p.2d 535
(Utah 1992)

Page 3,4

Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132 (Utah 1992)

Page 4

Mvers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981)

Page 4,5

O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139
(Utah 1991)

Page 5

Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480
(Utah 1975

Page 5

Warren v. Provo City, Corp, 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992)....Page 5
Yearslev v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990)

1

Page 5,6

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS APPEAL:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21
Utah Governmental Immunity Act
Utah Code, Section 78-2-2
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12
Utah Code Ann. §60-30-11
Utah Code Ann. §60-30-11 (4)(a)
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15

2

ARGUMENT:
There are three steps, with statutory deadlines associated
with each, for bringing a claim under the Governmental Immunity
Act.

These steps, and the facts in this case related to each,

are as follows:
First, the Appellant had one year from April 20, 1993 to
give written notice of his claim under the Governmental Immunity
Act (UCA Section 63-30-11; 63-30-12; 63-10-13).

Therefore, he

had until April 20, 1994 to serve written notice.
Before April 20, 1994, Appellant gave written notice of his
claim.

The first notice was made on August 9, 1993, and the

second notice on April 19, 1994.

Both of these notices were

within the time permitted by the statutes.
After the first notice, and before the second notice the
Appellant changed counsel.

The new attorney could not determine

from the file that the notice had been served.

Even if it had

been served, not all potential litigants were served.

The second

notice, before the statutory deadline, was served on additional
governmental entities who were not included within the first
notice.

Among those served was the State of Utah, requiring

compliance with UCA Section 63-30-12, with notice given to the
Utah Attorney General.

The State of Utah could not be ruled out

as a potential defendant by Appellant at the time, and therefore,
the second notice included the State.
to the Attorney General.

This required new notice

(See, eg. Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of
3

Transportation, 828 P. 2d 535 (Utah 1992).)

Proper notice,

appropriate to all parties receiving notice, was given in the
second, timely notice of claim.
The second step for bringing the claim is a denial of the
claim by the government.

This may be through an actual denial,

or by a constructive denial if no answer is made within 90 days
of the written claim.

(See, UCA Section 63-30-14.)

In this

case, there was a written denial by some of the notified
entities, and a constructive denial as to the rest.

As a result,

some parties to whom notice was given were not named in the
subsequent litigation.

The denial was effective as to all

notified parties as of July 18, 1994.
Thirdly, a suit must be brought within one year of the
denial.

(See, UCA Section 63-30-15.)

18, 1995 to bring his suit.
1995.

Appellant had until July

He filed his lawsuit on March 30,

Therefore, he complied with all applicable statutory

requirements.
The Defendant relies upon Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132
(Utah 1992).

This case does not support Defendant, however.

The

case involved medical malpractice, and not the governmental
immunity act.

It is accordingly irrelevant to the decision here.

In the case of Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981),
the Supreme Court went to some length to allow a case to proceed
which had technically failed under the statute of limitations.
In that case the discovery of the cause did not occur until after
the statute barred the claim.

The court found those
4

circumstances unjust, and allowed the stale claim to proceed to
its merits.

Here, the Defendant is arguing for the judicial

opposite of the Myers case.

The Defendant wants a judicially

created exception which defeats a claim before the statute of
limitations runs.
The case of O'Neal v. Division of Family Servicesf 821 P.2d
1139 (Utah 1991), cited by Defendant, deals with the issue of
incompetency under UCA Section 63-30-11 (4)(a), and is not
relevant here.
The facts of Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah
1992) are also off point.

In that case no notice was given until

over a year after the accident.

Therefore, the claim was barred.

Here, notice was given within the year, and suit filed within a
year of the second notice.
In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480
(Utah 1975), there was no notice given.

The claimant attempted

to substitute a conversation for written notice.

Here, written

notice in full compliance with the statute was given.
In Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) the notice
was late, and the plaintiff attempted to assert claims not
mentioned in the notice.

Here, the notice was timely, and

Appellant is pursuing the same claim as contained in the notice.
Without citing any authority for the proposition, the
Defendant is attempting to introduce a new requirement into the
statute.

The court is being asked to rule that a notice cannot

be amended within the time permitted by the statute.
5

You are

being asked to add to the statute a provision that if any notice
is given,

such notice is final, unamendable, and forever fixed.

If an amendment is needed to add parties, or claims, or both, or
to address additional theories, you are being asked to bar any
such amendment.

The holding in Yearsley, supra, held that claims

not raised in the notice could not be added by amendment of the
pleadings before the court.

It did not state that claims omitted

in a first notice could not be added in a second notice given
within the time permitted by the statute.

In fact, the case

assumes that if the notice had been amended during the
statutorily permitted period, the claim would have been
permitted.
The statute has erected a number of requirements to be met
before a claim is permitted.
in its requirements.

The statute is reasonably specific

It was not adopted to eliminate claims

against the State or its subdivisions.

It was adopted to provide

an orderly process for advancing such claims.

Additional

hurdles, requirements and barriers should not be added by the
court to what already has been prescribed by the legislature.
Nor should the statute be extended to its most restrictive
extreme.
The Defendant never replied to either notice of the
Appellant.

If the Defendant believed the second notice was

superfluous, and that the original notice was the point from
which all rights would reckon, it would have been simple to tell
the Appellant that.

Instead, the Defendant said nothing.
6

Then,

for the first time after the time had expired, the Defendant
advanced its novel theory of "one notice only" in its motion to
the court below.
As stated in Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App.
1994), the primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to
afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to
pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a
claim.

Plaintiff has satisfied this purpose.

Since Plaintiffs

second claim was legally sufficient and was filed within one year
of Plaintiffs injury, that notice of claim satisfies the
jurisdictional requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act.
The time limits for subsequent actions by Plaintiff must begin to
run from second claim.

Plaintiff has met all relevant time

limits set forth by law.
CONCLUSION
The lower court should be reversed.

The additional notice

given was needed, under the circumstances.
from the date of the second notice.

.
DATED this

A
'. \

day of February, 1996.
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Therefore, time runs
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SUPREME COURT

78-2-2

CHAPTER 2
SUPREME COURT
Section
78-2-2.

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree
or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3) (a) through (d).

78-2a-3

JUDICIAL CODE
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(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3) (b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 7S-2-2, enacted bv L.
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1887, ch. 161, § 303; 1988,
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1892, ch. 127,
§ 11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5;
1995, ch. 299, § 46.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,1992, in Subsection (4),
deleted former Subsections (e) and (f), which
read: "general water adjudication" and "taxation and revenue; and," respectively, making
related changes; redesignated former Subsec-

tion (g) as Subsection (e); and made stylistic
changes in Subsection (e).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
added Subsections (3)(k) and (4)(e), making
related changes.
The 1995 amendments by ch. 267 and ch.
299, both effective May 1,1995, made the same
changes: they changed "Board of State Lands
and Forestry" to "School and Institutional Trust
Lands Board of Trustees" in Subsection
(3)(e)(iii) and added Subsection (3)(eXvi).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appellate juris diction.
—Attachment.
—Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Certiorari.
Original jurisdiction.
—Extraordinary writs.
Cited.

Certiorari.
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction
granted by this section, the Supreme Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals,
not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the
parties should address the decision of the Court
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court.
Butterneid v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992).

Appellate jurisdiction.

Original jurisdiction.

—Attachment.
Although this section did not govern a land
conveyance because it was not in effect when
petitioner filed its writ of review, this section
did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, because jurisdiction attached under the
statute in effect when the petition for review
was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n
v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah
1993).

—Extra ordinary writs.
The term "onginar in Subsection (2) adds
nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — and its absence in § 78-2a-3(l) takes
nothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals — because jurisdiction over petitions
for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a
court's jurisdiction to consider a petition originally filed with it as opposed to its appellate
jurisdiction over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).

ANALYSIS

—Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Subdivision (3)(e)(ni) confers jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court only over final orders and
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992).

Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464
(Utah 1991).

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

7S-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:

Rule 21
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

C o m p i l e r ' s Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 20, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. • • Separate trial authorized, U.R.C.P. 42(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Insurer.
—Declaratory action as to effect of policy.
—Personal injur} action.
Cited.
Insurer.
— D e c l a r a t o r y action as to effect of policy.
One who claims to be damaged by the negligent act of anoiher is not a proper pari) to an
action by the insurer of the latter under a public liability policy, whereby ? decicrctcry judgment is sought declaring the legal effect of the
terms of such policy. Utah Farm Bureau Ins.

Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277
(1957).
—Personal injury action.
Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insurance company as a party defendant in a personal injury action, ba^ed on insurance policy
providing that the insurance company "has
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim
has been prosecuted to a conclusion," did not
come within the joinder provision of either
Rule IS b) or this rule. Young v. Barney, 20
Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 8*6 U9G7).
Cited in Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404
P.2d 964 (1965); Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith,
646 P.2d 737 (Utah 19S2).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59 Am J u r 2d Parties i> 92
et sea ; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial £ 12.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J S Parties ^ 33 to 35, SS
C.J.S. Trial ** 7 to 10.

Key N u m b e r s . 27; Trial c=» 3, 4.

Parties c= 13 to 16, 24 to

Rule 21. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Compiler's Note*.
to Rule Hi. r.JiCV

This rule i«* identical
NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

Added parties.
—Sen ice of process.
—Sole owner of dissolved corporation.
Severance.
Added p a r t i e s .
—Service of p r o e e r s .
Even though sons were necessary parties
and in court during the trial, the court could
not make the sons parties defendant without
service of summons or other process. Monroe
Citv v. Arnold, 22 Utah 2d 291, 452 P.2d 321
(1969).

—Sole owner of dissolved corporation.
Trial court had discretion to allow individual
who was sole owner of corporate stock and
grantee of land in question to join as plaintiff
in action brought by corporation to quiet tax
title to land where corporation had been dissolved prior to suit. Falconaero Enter., Inc. v.
Bowers, 1C Utah 2d 202, 398 P.2d 206 (1965).
Severance.
Severance is within the sound discretion of
the trial court and, absent abuse of such discretion, will not be upset on appeal. King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
§^ 259 to 278

59 Am Jur. 2d Parties

C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties § 139 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Parties <e=» 77 to 92.

Rule 22. Interpleader.
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may
be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objecting to the
joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their
claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but are
adverse to and independent of cne another, cr that the plaintiff avers that he
is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant
exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of crossclaim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement and do not in
any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-13

63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch.
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment near the end of the section substituted
"Section 63-30-11" for "Subsection 63-30-11(4)"
and added "regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental."

Cross-References. — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.
Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Administrative proceedings.
Claims barred.
Claims by minors.
Claims for death.
Contract action.
Estoppel.
Full compliance required.
Necessity for presentation of claim
Notice.
Cited.

claim against state. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973).
Trial court properly dismissed complaint
against county where notice of the claim was
not filed with the county commission during
the year following plaintiffs discovery of her
injuries. Yates v Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P ?d 352 (Utah 1980).

Administrative proceedings.
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement following decision to terminate his services had
no claim for breach of contract until after adverse result at administrative hearing provided for by the school termination provisions
(now § 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he
filed his notice of claim within the statutory
period after termination of the hearing, he
complied with the requirements of this section.
Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah
1977) (decided under former law).
Claims barred.
Neither actual knowledge by county officials
of circumstances which resulted in death of
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile
accident nor minority of the child dispensed
with necessity of filing timely claim in action
against county in which it was alleged that
death was due to inadequate warning signs
and an improperly constructed guardrail;
timely claim against county was necessary
even though county highway department employee allegedly advised child's attorney, incorrectly, that highway in question was maintained by state, resulting in initial filing of

Claims by minors.
Failure of a minor to give notice within the
time pro\ided m this section does not bar the
minor's claim as the time for notice is tolled
during minontv bv § 78-12-36. Scott v School
Bd 568 P 2d 7-16 (Utah 1977).
Claims for death.
In ca»es Involving claims for death, the statutory period would commence to run on the
date of death of the person injured, inasmuch
as that is the date upon which the damage accrues to the personal representative or third
party entitled to recover for such wrongful
death. Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356,
135 P.2d 259 (1943) (decided under former
law).
Contract action.
An action on a contractual obligation is a
claim permitted under this chapter, and notice
of such claim must be filed in accordance with
this section. Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d
291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972).
Estoppel.
County was not estopped from pleading the
filing deadline of the statutory period as a bar
to the claim of a boy who had been injured at
school while playing with dangling wires, even
though the principal of the school erroneously

537

63-30-14

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

informed the mother that public service company was responsible for the wires, and she did
not discover until after the filing deadline that
the county tree-trimming employees were in
fact responsible. Scarborough v. Granite School
Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) (decided under
former law).
Full compliance required.
Before suit against a political subdivision
can be allowed, plaintiff must have fully complied with the statutory requirements; and
thus, prior to filing suit, a claim must be filed
which (1) is in writing, (2) states the facts and
the nature of the claim, (3) is signed by the
claimant, (4) is directed and delivered to someone authorized to receive it, and (5) has been
filed within the prescribed time. Scarborough
v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah
1975).
Necessity for presentation of claim.
Plaintiff had no cause of action for damages
to his crops caused by seepage of water from
defendant city's canal where no claim was presented therefor to city within a year Dahl v

Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 (1915)
(decided under former law).
Presentation of claim within time fixed by
law is a condition precedent to bringing action
against municipality Brown v. Salt Lake City
33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619*
126 Am. St R. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (1908);
Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228
P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law).
Notice.
The fact that employees of the county in fact
knew of the plaintiffs injuries at the time they
occurred does not dispense with the necessity
of filing a timely claim. Edwards v. Iron
County ex rel. Valley View Medical Center
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975).
Notice provision in this section is applicable
to § 63-30-9 Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former
law).
Cited in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276
(Utah 1985); Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165
(Utah 1988)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am Jur 2d Municipal
Corporations, Count.es and Othe r Political
Subdmsions § 680 ct seq
C.J.S. — 20 C J S Counties §§ 297, 298,
3 2 3 , 6 4 C J S Mun:c.n*l Corporations ^ 2173,
2174, 2199, 79 C J 5 Schools and School Districts §§ 423, 433

A.L.R. — See A L R Annotations set forth
under * 63-30-11
Key Numbers. — Counties <$=> 200, 203, 213;
Municipal Corporations @=> 1001, 1005, 1008,
1021, Schools and School Districts <$=> 112, 115.

63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
Within ninet}' days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14.

63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filing action against governmental entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
538

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-16

expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
H i s t o r y : L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1933, ch.
129, * 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1985 amendment substituted "or an employee of the entity" for "in those circumstances in which immunity from suit has been waived in this chapter" at the end of the first bentence

The 1987 amendment added the designations to the previously undesignated section, m
Subsection (2), added at the end "regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the
claim is characterized as governmental", and
made minor changes in phraseology

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Amended complaint
Estoppel
Extension of time for filing suit
Waiver for contractual obligations
Amended complaint.
Plaintiffs complied with this section where,
within a year after the cause of action arose,
thev filed notice of claim with the attorney
general and the agency concerned on the same
day they filed the original complaint with the
court, and amended complaint alleging compliance 'vith the G o \ i i n m e n t a l Immunity Act
\v io tiled, as a nattei of rignt within one >ear
after denial of t h j c l a ' n or aitv.r the end of the
90-da\ penod m wmJa the claua is detmed to
have been denied Johnson v Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P 2 d 1234 (Utah 1980)
Estoppel.
Whether city was estopped to asseit statute
of limitationi m ^uit for injuries sustained by
chi«d m cave-m at a t ; -owned clay bank adjacent to municipally maintained park was a
quebt'on of fact, entiy or no cauze of action
judgment waa precluded v\ht»re evidence piesented dispute as to whether plaintiffs' attorney had been "lulled" into not filing suit by
assurances there »vould be a oettlement within
insurance policy limits Whicaker v Salt Lake
City C o r p , 522 P 2d 1252 (Utah 1974)

Governmental entity vvas not estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations on 'he basis
that an adjustor of its insurance carrier
"lulled" plaintiff into delay where plamtuf vvao
at all times represented by an attorney
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P 2d 925 (Utah 1977/.
E x t e n s i o n of time for filing suit.
Where plaintiff sustained i n j u r i a fi^m alleged fail from negligently
maintained
bleachers on school grounds and evidence indicated that delay in filing claim wa^ cauoed by
misiepresentations of school's insurance aj^nt,
trial couit erred in Iismi-sirg comnlaint vith
prejudice on gioundo that ^ratuie of iiraitationb
barrtd such claim Rice v Giamte School Dist,
23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P 2d 159 (1969), distinguished, Scarborough v Granite School D i s t ,
531 P 2 d 4S0 (Utah 1975)
Waiver for c o n t r a c t u a l obligations.
Whore a sanitarv district sc" cr li^e became
clogged, resulting in damages to houses owned
by a private citizen, a subsequent action
against the sewer district was not subject to
the one-vear limitations penod for actions
against the government insofar as it was based
on breach of contract Dal ton v Salt Lake Sub
Son Dist, 676 P 2d 399 (Utah 1984)

83-C0-13. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — Application of Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action
brought under this chapter, and such actions shall be governed by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are consistent with this chapter.
H i s t o r y : L. 1065, ch. 139, § 18; 1933, ch.
129, § 7.
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

District court jurisdiction
Sovereign immunity in federal courts.
District court jurisdiction.
The district court had exclusive, original jurisdiction of an action by the former chairman
and director of the state liquor control commission for attorneys' fees incurred in the successful defense of twelve indictments issued
against him for alleged acts or omissions com-

milled in his official capacity since this section
is not in conflict with Utah Const., Art. VII,
g e c 1 3 H u l b e r t v S l a t e > 6 0 7 R 2 d 1217 (Utah
1980)
_
.
.A . . , _
Sovereign immunity in federal courts.
Thls act lacks the clear lntent
necessary
under
Eleventh Amendment to U.S. Constitutl0n to
waive state's immunity from suit in federal court. Harris v. Tooele County School
Dist, 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).

63-30-17. Venue of actions.
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the claim
arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against a county may be brought in the
county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave
granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions
against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be
brought in the county in which the political subdivision is located or in the
county in which the claim arose.
History: L. 19C5, ch. 139, fc 17; 1983, ch.
129, * 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Federal court actions.
This section indicates Utah does not intend
to waive sovereign immunity under Eleventh

Amendment to U S Constitution. Harris v.
Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th
Cir. 1973).

63-30-1S. Compromise and settlement of actions.
A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal officer or other legal
counsel if it has no such officer, may compromise and settle any action as to
the damages or other relief sought.
The risk manager in the Department of Administrative Services may compromise and settle any claim for damages filed against the state up to and
including $10,000 for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable, and
may, with the concurrence of the attorney general or his representative and
the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compromise and settle a claim for damages in excess of $10,000 for which the Risk
Management Fund may be liable.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 18; 1981, ch.
250, § 6; 1983, ch. 303, § 2; 1983, ch. 320,
§ 54.
Cross-References. — Governmental Immunity Act provisions not construed as admission
or denial of liability, § 63-30-4.
Payment of medical and similar expenses

not admissible to prove liability for injury,
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409.
Rescission of release or settlement by injured
person, §§ 78-27-32 to 78-27-36.
R ^ m a n a g e r in Department of Administrat i v e Services, § 63-1-45 et seq.
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